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Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
W hat is it that one “compare”-s in Comparative Literature?Goethe’s Weltliteratur is usually invoked when talking about the beginnings of a comparative literature. The other story is Leo 
Spitzer and Erich Auerbach in Turkey. There is also the story of the rise 
of the discipline of Comparative Literature to intellectual prominence 
in the United States in the period following the Second World War, 
largely as a result of the migration to the United States of a group of 
noted European comparativists seeking asylum from totalitarianism. 
This group had a great influence in fostering the theoretical transfor-
mation of literary studies and in bringing about fundamental changes 
in national literature studies. But to think of comparative literature as 
comparative had something to do with the notion of la littérature comparée 
in France—where comparison implicitly referred to the standards of the 
French eighteenth century. This attitude is reflected in the fundamental 
premises of Pascale Casanova’s work today.1 René Etiemble’s Comparaison 
n’est pas raison attempted, in 1963, to combat that impulse in a manner 
that is still favorably comparable to much that goes on in the Euro-U.S. 
today.2 But in terms of the questions we are asking, it is still too much 
within the internationalist side of cold war logic—going no further than 
the front-line languages of India and East Asia, with a somewhat paternal-
istic approach. Whatever the outcome of that debate, and whatever the 
status of the classical traditions of Asia, Comparative Literature within the 
United States remained confined to European literary regionalism. After 
the cold war, the division between a Eurocentric Comparative Literature 
and geopolitically oriented “Area Studies” seemed to have become less 
tenable than before. But comparison in favor of the European tradition 
has remained in place.
Seen another way, comparison assumes a level playing field and the 
field is never level, if only in terms of the interest implicit in the perspec-
tive. It is, in other words, never a question of compare and contrast, but 
rather a matter of judging and choosing. When the playing fields are 
not even continuous, the problem becomes immense. Most metropoli-
tan countries acknowledge the problem simply because of the volume 
of migration in recent decades. There, a certain degree of levelness 
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(entry into the circuit of citizenship, desired when denied) is already 
established. I, on the other hand, write as I have always written, as soon 
as I began to publish in the seventies, with a sense of the world rather 
than the demands of immigrants, in themselves also and of course a 
powerful disciplinary initiative. I would, however, like to distinguish my 
position, simply because it does not arise from “the forcing of cultures 
into greater proximity.” Charles Bernheimer wanted Comparative Lit-
erature to include “subaltern perspectives.”3 As I have regularly noted, 
I am just as regularly asked to help curate shows that will, give or take 
the culture, “bring the barrio to the museum.” This is to misunderstand 
even the way in which denial/desire/demand work in the establishment 
of the class-cross-hatched space of migrant generations in metropolitan 
space. The degree of systemic change necessary for such transference 
to take place is precisely the issue.
It is absurd to expect a humanities discipline to bring about these 
changes. The result of the steady influx of people from elsewhere into 
the metropolis and the attendant demands are reflected in Compara-
tive Literature in the last few decades in the following way: each literary 
tradition, tied to a dominant language group, confronts the narratives 
produced by this Eurocentric history, more or less. Thus we have a con-
frontation of Comparative Literature and East Asian languages; Compara-
tive Literature and South Asian languages; Comparative Literature and 
Central/North Asian languages are just stirring. Comparative Literature 
and Arabic/Persian/Turkish shades off into orientalism as such (“a man-
ner of regularized (or Orientalized) writing, vision, and study, dominated 
by imperatives, perspectives, and ideological biases ostensibly suited to 
the Orient”) and, through Bulgarian, into Ottoman Studies and Balkan 
Studies.4 The modern period in each of these language groups relates 
in a different way to that main tradition, which remains “Europe” as af-
fected by Eastern European theory filtered through France.
We are not speaking of Cultural Studies here. Very generally speak-
ing, I think it is safe to say that Cultural/Ethnic Studies, generally 
considered to be the political corrective to Eurocentric Comparative 
Literature, legitimizes the implicit comparison by reversal. This is of 
course too sweeping a generalization and would have to be modified in 
any extended discussion.
Mainstream Comparative Literature divided over French theory. It has 
been touched also by the transformation of German theory through the 
fall of mere socialism. One consequence of these circumstances was the 
flight of intellectuals and the rise of comparativism. The much more 
resplendent social-philosophical consequence of that was Hannah Arendt 
and the Frankfurt School. 
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This is the set we consider when we think of rethinking comparativism. 
When we, the first generation of U.S. PhDs in Comparative Literature, 
were graduate students in the sixties, we took a certain pride in asserting 
that the word “comparative” in our discipline was a misnomer, that the 
point about Comparative Literature was that it did not exactly “compare.” 
For the last few years, some of us have been trying to rethink comparativ-
ism by pondering how exactly Comparative Literature does not compare 
and how that not-comparing can shelter something affirmative.
I think the solution we found in the sixties is not quite right for these 
times. Those of us who belonged to the U.S. mainstream of comparative 
literature found affinity among national literatures in place of what the 
verb “compare” offers: not only the etymological “pairing with” but also 
some hint of ranking. We found a strong ally in the theory of archetypes, 
psychoanalytic with C. G. Jung and R. D. Laing, literary-historical with 
Thomas O. Brown and Northrop Frye. Notions of the collective uncon-
scious allowed us to bypass the problem of comparison and ranking. 
That line of work has found a strong champion today in my colleague 
and friend David Damrosch.5 I admire his work so greatly and so enjoy 
working with him that I should make clear that in this context, now, my 
thinking is different from his. 
What was especially useful for us in those early days was the study of 
topoi, sets of imageme-narrateme-philosophemes that seemed to travel 
without either historical or psychic ballast across the history of litera-
tures and cultures that make us code geography, write our world. The 
Greek god Apollo and the Hindu goddess of learning, Saraswati, share 
the swan as a familiar. Ernst Robert Curtius was our guide here.6 In the 
nineties, I wrote on “Echo” in this manner, finding in the nonagential 
voicing of the Greek mythological figure a way to think about woman’s 
fate, particularly in postcoloniality.7 As graduate students, we had been 
helped by the topological phenomenologies of Gaston Bachelard, Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, and Georges Poulet.8 I still recognize those trajectories 
in Emmanuel Levinas (though not as a placeholder for comparison) 
and, of course, in the work of Jacques Derrida, whose brilliant topologi-
cal slides do indeed teach us to think about relations without relations 
between diverse European texts.
Encompassing structures and archetypo-topical texture, not strictly 
polarized, helped us think affinity in place of mere comparison. We know 
today that those great networks of affiliations work by way of exclusions. 
Apollo and Saraswati quietly ignore those who have no right to learn-
ing. It is perhaps not too contentious to point out also that, in today’s 
divided world, to discover varieties of sameness is to give in too easily to 
the false promises of a level playing field. 
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I am standing with my mother in Charles de Gaulle airport in Paris. 
For a week we have fed our ears on academic French. Suddenly I hear 
an exchange in the harsh accents of upstate New York. I turn to my 
mother and say, in Bengali, roughly this: “Hard to listen to this stuff.” 
And my mother: “Dear, a mother tongue.” My mother, caught up as she 
was in the heyday of resistance against the Raj, still extended imagina-
tive charity to English. 
I have told this story before and will say it again. Today I hold on to the 
fact that there is a language we learn first, mixed with the prephenomenal, 
which stamps the metapsychological circuits of “lingual memory.”9 The 
child invents a language, beginning by bestowing signification upon a 
part-object (Melanie Klein). The parents “learn” this language. Because 
they speak a named language, the child’s language gets inserted into the 
named language with a history before the child’s birth, which will con-
tinue after its death. As the child begins to navigate this language, he/
she is beginning to access the entire interior network of the language, 
all its possibility of articulations, for which the best metaphor that can be 
found is—especially in the age of computers—“memory.” By comparison, 
“cultural memory” is a crude concept of narrative rememorization that 
attempts to privatize the historical record.
Comparative Literature imagines that each language may be activated 
in this special way and makes an effort to produce a simulacrum through 
the reflexivity of language as habit. Here we translate not the content 
but the very moves of languaging. We can provisionally call this peculiar 
form of translation before translation the “comparison” in Comparative 
Literature.
This is not to make an opposition between the natural spontaneity of 
the emergence of “my languaged place” and the artificial effortfulness of 
learning foreign languages. Rather it is to emphasize the metapsychologi-
cal and telecommunicative nature of the subject’s being encountered by 
the languaging of place.10 If we entertain the spontaneous/artificial op-
position, we will possibly value our own place over all and thus defeat the 
ethical comparativist impulse. Embracing another place as my creolized 
space may be a legitimation by reversal. We know now that the hybrid is 
not an issue here. If, on the other hand, we recall the helplessness before 
history (our own and of the languaged place) in our acquisition of our 
first dwelling in language, we just may sense the challenge of producing 
a simulacrum, always recalling that this language too, depending on the 
subject’s history, can inscribe lingual memory—in other words, a sense 
of equivalence among languages, rather than a comparison of historico-
civilizational content. Étienne Balibar has suggested that equivalence 
blurs differences, whereas equality requires them. Precisely because civil 
war may be the allegoric name for an extreme form of untranslatability, 
it is that “blurring” that Comparative Literature needs.
613rethinking comparativism
I am not making claims of cultural equivalence or full translatability—
the unexamined, dull anthropologism of cultural relativism. If you do not 
assume language to be isomorphic with cultural formation, you cannot 
move to such convictions. The apparent discrepancies in cultural power, 
measured on the grid of place to space, are meaningful in terms of the 
language’s relative elaboration and importance. They become a matter of 
constative historical inquiry and performative resistance in the present, 
always waiting for what will have happened.11 This is why we must remain 
mindful that the assumption of equivalence is upstream from all the 
historical language battles of postcoloniality and neocolonial power that 
are still being fought and must continue to be fought. I repeat that this 
is not nativism, any language or language(s) can perform this function. 
If in situations of migration, the first language is lost, it is still a loss—not 
because of any kind of nationalist nostalgia—but because that originary 
metapsychological constitution of ethical semiosis is de-activated. I think 
there is some kind of historical process that shifts those mechanisms into 
the newly chosen “naturalized” “first” language—which operates most 
successfully in the second generation.
Our rethinking of comparativism starts, then, with the admission that 
as language, languages are equivalent, and that deep language learning 
must implode into a simulacrum of lingual memory. We must wait for 
this implosion, which we sense after the fact, or, perhaps, others sense 
in us, and we thus enter into a relationship with the language that is 
rather different from the position of a comparer, a charter of influence, 
who supposedly occupies a place above the linguistic traditions to be 
compared. In other words, I have had enough of being told that impe-
rialism gave us the novel.
Comparative Literature, then, begins to insist on the irreducibility of 
idiom, even as it insists on translation as commonly understood. When 
we rethink comparativism, we think of translation as an active rather 
than a prosthetic practice. I have often said that translation is the most 
intimate act of reading. Thus translation comes to inhabit the new politics 
of comparativism as reading itself, in the broadest possible sense.
In the name of comparativism as equivalence, we are prepared to 
undertake a serious and continuous undoing of nationalist or national 
language-based reading. We have not moved too far from the regional-
ist impulse of the initial vision of European Comparative Literature. 
We have simply announced a worldly future. It is our hope that, in this 
process, the performativity of comparativism will face the task of undoing 
historical injustice toward languages associated with peoples who were 
not successfully competitive within capitalism—with the added proviso 
that these languages attempt to establish an interconnection among 
themselves through our disciplinary and institutional help. This will take 
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us a step outside the necessarily nation-centered and culture-centered 
frontiers of the United Nations.
The idea of a subaltern collectivity of languages and literatures out-
side of national-language restrictions is a difficult one. In order to take 
the diversified subaltern or less-taught languages out of enclavist or 
collectivist pedagogy and politics, to save Comparative Literature from 
unacknowledged and exclusivist comparison, structural and epistemo-
logical changes are required. I will quote some prose here that reflects 
a long, ongoing effort at institutional change. The implicit terms of 
resistance—this is against globalization—entrenches comparison beyond 
the discipline, indeed situates the discipline upon contemporary cogni-
tive topography in a negligible niche. I leave this caution here, proceed 
to the institutional passages, and close with two readings that can only 
look forward to the necessary yet impossible institutional guarantee of 
access to equivalence. Here is the institutional passage, used in a couple 
of grant proposals:
Even as we want to include Europe and necessarily the United States in any 
version of a globalized world, we also recognize that our efforts cannot succeed 
without a thorough-going program of the less-taught languages of that world 
. . . This latter group could only be taught for a few semesters, with insufficient 
quality control, by insufficiently trained instructors, and with no possibility of 
students moving on to a major or a doctoral track. This lack of parity between 
established and less-taught languages goes against the very spirit of an enlight-
ened globalization of the curriculum. This is matched by the lack of parity 
between teachers of language and teachers of literature in all U.S. universities 
. . . . The labor is, of course, immense. It will involve faculty development semi-
nars, postdoctoral fellows, extensive and new recruitment procedures, and the 
involvement of national professional associations. There must be a consortium, 
since the less commonly taught languages are many, the need is acute, no single 
university could hope to cover all bases and, given distant learning resources, 
the first stages of language learning could easily be shared.12
It is in view of the resistance to institutional change that I often speak 
of the humanities supplementing globalization by providing a world. The 
worldliness of our new Comparative Literature could be a key element in 
this continuing and persistent effort. For, given the differential between 
the “first” language and others, the equivalence that would formalize 
our new Comparative Literature will never be fully established. We 
must always work in the element of simulacra, putting in place a bond 
between the world’s neglected languages. The literature of Okinawa will 
then take its place with the wisdom songs of Ghana and the historical 
fables of the Popol Vuh. 
I want to make a methodological point before I conclude. We start 
from an assumption of linguistic equivalence, which rests on language’s 
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capacity to inscribe. Always with one language as accidental standard, we 
escape national restrictions and create the simulacrum of equivalence 
through deep language learning across the spectrum of the subaltern 
languages of the world. The diversity and singularity of idiom remain a 
constant reminder of the singularity of languages. The absence of mate-
rial equivalence provokes historical study. Within this procedural frame, 
how do we read now as comparativists?
Over the last few years, teaching the introductory course in Compara-
tive Literature and Society to graduate and undergraduate alike, I have 
drawn a conclusion: in disciplinary method we remain astute. Attention 
to idiom, demonstration through textual analysis, acquisition of expertise 
in plotting the play of logic in rhetoric and vice versa. In so far as our 
object of investigation is concerned, however, we acknowledge as com-
parativist any attempt that the text makes to go outside of its space-time 
enclosure, the history and geography by which the text is determined. 
Thus disciplinary convention expands toward what would otherwise 
escape it, and the field expands greatly, in many ways.
I now test my notion of textual comparativism with a look at Medoruma 
Shun’s short story translated “Hope.”13
“Hope” has been called “the first post-colonial work of Okinawan litera-
ture.”14 Like all postcoloniality, it looks forward to an undecidable future. 
Its very title, “Hope,” out of joint with the narrative content, gives us a 
sense of this. How can it help us in the task of rethinking Comparative 
Literature in view of such an undecidable future?
By my disciplinary responsibility I would have to undertake the difficult 
journey of entering Japanese idiom and its relationship to the idiom of 
Okinawa. I would have to plot the relationships as I would, with appro-
priate differences, in Ireland or Hong Kong. I am ill prepared for this. 
What I can attempt now is the lesson of reading—locating an impulse 
toward comparativism in this new sense in the story itself.
The story is about a sacrifice and a suicide. Upon a scene of political 
conflict, such a double gesture often reflects a comparativism of last re-
sort: a plea to the political other to recognize equivalence, to respond, 
and, finally, to end oppression. I have been long attracted to this species 
of comparativism, attempting to go outside of the space-timc enclosure, 
when that enclosure means oppression, colonial or gendered or both, 
undoing history and geography by inscribing the body with death. 
I place the story of “Hope” in that genre with “Can the Subaltern 
Speak?” with suicide bombing in Palestine, with Viken Berberian’s The 
Bicyclist, with Santosh Sivan’s “The Terrorist,” a film dealing with antico-
lonial resistance and gender in Sri Lanka. 
One of the characteristics of this species of comparativism in extremis 
is the double bind between ethics and politics. This too is a theme that 
attracts me greatly.
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(Comparativism in extremis is not a disciplinary choice of method. It can 
be located in our objects of investigation if it is represented. Compara-
tivism in extremis is a political gesture when response [perhaps based 
on that lesson of equivalence in a context broader than our discipline] 
is denied. I have given above a few examples of such representation, 
including “Hope.” Bamako, a film I will discuss at the end of this essay, 
is a teaching text, not a representation of comparativisim in extremis. 
The film hopes that its lesson—the difference between resistance and 
the people—will be learned. Other examples of the representation of 
comparison in extremis—merely indexed—is a line in Rabindranath 
Tagore that I have discussed elsewhere. Speaking of the people to whom 
human rights were denied millennially in India, he writes: “‘mrityumajhe 
hobe tobe chitabhashshe shobar shoman’—you [addressing his “unfortunate 
country”] will then be equal to all of them in the ashes of death, thus 
predicting the death of a nation.” The only thing that will make me 
equal to you, because you deny response, is a shared death. This is also 
the theme of Ernesto Cardenal’s poem “Prayer for Marilyn Monroe” 
(1965), made into a film by the Instituto Cubano de Arte e Industria 
Cinematográfico [ICAIC], where the items of comparison are Marilyn 
Monroe, with her desperate life on the one hand and the millions of 
dead children in Latin America on the other, standing in as victims of 
the U.S. system, a place of no response. Cardenal is a priest, a liberation 
theologian—for him in death the two sides were equal in God’s eyes, 
comparison as equivalence in extremis. Perhaps it may be said that our 
lesson of learning equivalence, practicing equivalence, indexing a small 
epistemic change or shift, may come to facilitate a world where compari-
son in extremis will no longer be required.)
A double bind, then. Between ethics (I must not kill) and politics (I can 
have a “response” from my nonrespondent[s] only in a shared death).
To some the double bind seems a dangerous idea. And yet, to deny its 
pervasiveness leads to failed revolutions. Paradoxically, to acknowledge 
its pervasiveness does not lead to unqualified success. This is its danger. 
I have put together a somewhat positive description, which I will share 
with you today. This by no means exhausts the power and danger of the 
double bind. The one thing that we can propose is that the fiction and 
reality of comparativism in extremis often makes visible the double bind 
between ethics and politics. 
Here, then, is my somewhat bland and optimistic account of the double 
bind, which some of you have already heard:
The double bind can be a general description of all doing, all think-
ing as doing, all self-conscious living. Contradictory instructions come 
to us at all times. We learn to listen to them and remain in the game. 
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When and as we make a decision, we know that we have broken the 
double bind into a single bind, as it were, and that change will have to 
be undertaken soon, or, things will change. If we don’t know this, our 
self-congratulation is typically followed by denial or bewilderment.15 
To put it formulaically, as does the fiction, the political situation re-
quires the violence of sacrifice: “What Okinawa needs now is not demonstra-
tions by thousands of people or rallies by tens of thousands, but the death of one 
American child.”16 Yet the ethical unacceptability of violence requires the 
destruction of the political subject or actor. The pull of the ethical is so 
strong that the political act cannot be described as willed: “Just as fluids 
in the bodies of a small creature that is frightened suddenly turn into 
poison, [so] this deed of mine is natural and what had to happen [hitsu-
zen] for this island, I thought.” And the pull of the political is so strong 
that the act representing the ethical is also a sacrifice and a destruction. 
The impossibility of containing the ethical subject in its worldly envelope 
is indicated in the text by the management of time: 
At the moment that I reclosed the trunk, the sun broke through the cloud veil that 
covered the sky. I am sweating, and I break out in goose bumps. I crossed the forest 
on foot . . . and returned home. . . . The air conditioning doesn’t work . . . I lower 
the windows but I pour with sweat. I went up to Naha city . . . . I pour a bottle 
of gasoline on my jacket and pants. . . . A group of junior high schoolchildren 
came running . . . 17
The sweating and sacrificing body breaks through into the present tense 
as the narrative progresses in the past tense. The body reenters the nar-
rated past as an object before language in the last sentence.
On the side of the dominant, there is the longing for a release from 
the double bind between nationalism (the political) and responsibility 
(the ethical). Thus Oe Kenzaburo repeats a phrase in 1969: “Is it pos-
sible to change to a Japanese who is not a Japanese?”18 
The dominant can also refuse this longing and simply deny the double 
bind. Here is a comment from the staff of the Japan Policy Research In-
stitute: “Americans are likely to be shocked by Medoruma’s subject matter 
and tone.” It is a well-meaning comment, for the staff then proceed to 
list U.S. marine criminal activity against Ryukyuans, especially females. 
Yet to separate nationalism and responsibility is precisely a denial of the 
double bind that can reduce resistance to the politically correct.
One of the incidental but altogether astute moments in “Hope” is 
when the narrator recognizes that every inhabitant of the island is not 
infected by what I am calling comparativism in extremis—the necessity 
to call for a response from the colonizer. The first gesture from an is-
lander is the innocent one of joy at seeing a known person on TV! And 
the last gesture is the equally innocent frivolity of the children kicking 
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the agent reduced to object. Between these two gestures of innocence 
lies the story, apparently useless. Commemorated in fiction, it becomes 
useful if we learn how to read as we mark time toward a comparativism 
of equivalence.
Without this, we cannot pick up the message if an artist points at the 
distance between protest and the people. Abderrahmane Sissako’s film 
Bamako (2006), for example, is regularly read like a documentary of 
protest by most policy-oriented folks.
The film stages a trial, held in an African compound, by African judges 
and lawyers, with the participation of two white lawyers on either side, 
of the World Bank for its crimes in Africa. The trial is contained within 
fragments of local action and a slim subplot about the death of a char-
ismatic singer’s husband.
The new comparativism can read this film as a filmic discourse on 
epistemic discontinuity in the welding of place. We notice how much of 
the staging is in terms of a relief map of languages, colonial and local. 
The trial is framed by a community where only the ones who have gradu-
ated into the discursive practice of the good whites are able to “speak 
the truth.” The director took good care to point this out by making the 
subplot with a very attractive singer, by closing the film with her, focus-
ing on her husband’s death, and making clear that it has little to do 
with the main argument. The high point of eloquence in the film, and 
deliberately, if you notice the framing, is the good white guy (apparently 
the director just gave them the parts and said, “now speak”)—makes 
us think precisely about the problem. There are also the moments of 
grassroots choice when access to the “trial” of the World Bank is turned 
off by the young men of the village, the real agents of collaboration with 
the destruction of the country. The bridge agents are a woman who is 
accused of not fitting the evidentiary structure and, on another level 
altogether, the traditional healer who utters (apparently in a language 
not necessarily understood by the “native speakers”). The complexity of 
the framing is evident also in the presence of the film within the film, 
an exaggerated eye-catching African Western.
The entire film can be a figuration of why resistance against the trans-
national agencies misfires. But it is inconvenient and counterintuitive 
to understand this.
A few images now merely to suggest how the film might figure the 
separation, indeed the discontinuity, between resistance and the people.19 
It is not without significance, surely, that the World Social Forum had 
had a meeting in Bamako just before the film’s release. I will repeat my 
earlier points in order to relate them to the images.
We are looking at a symbolic trial of the World Bank, staged in an Afri-
can compound in Bamako. Sissako places two persons outside the frame: 
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the charismatic female singer who would travel easily into the musical 
circle of global protest and the traditional healer. The name of the film 
appears on the screen after those two placings outside of the work.
Figure 1. Singer interrupts film to have bustier laced
Figure 2. Healer leaves trial
Here is the woman singing simply to show her forceful presence in 
the film. Indeed this bit is used to promote the film—although it is not 
part of the trial, where the participating Africans have achieved sufficient 
continuity with the European Enlightenment to be able to criticize its 
travesty:
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Now to images where, in the film, Sissako distinguishes carefully be-
tween the difference in the response.
First, the good white guy testifying against the World Bank. He speaks 
in metaphors and the audience is shown responding collectively.
Figure 3. Singer’s dynamism
Figure 4. Good white guy
Next, the black woman testifying. She is eloquent, speaks more statis-
tics. The response is more singular, less public.
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Then the traditional healer, who finally intervenes, out of place. This 
is an undecidable moment, the moment of a double bind. For, if Ma-
madou Diouf is right, the Africans here do not necessarily understand 
what he sings. It may indeed be a procedural complaint on his own 
behalf. The response is mysterious, a pattern of close-ups of individual 
faces. We contemplate the distinction between singularity—repeatable 
difference—and the individual subject.
Figure 5. Black woman testifying
Figure 6. Healer singing
Contrast the much more innocent and open response to the African-
Western film within a film. This too is discontinuous from the trial. The 
African Western, with Danny Glover starring, is a generic opposite from 
Bamako, the film in which it is embedded. That is already a discontinuity. 
Further, the kind of innocent joy in such bloody mayhem that is portrayed 
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in the mother and daughter is remote indeed from a critique of Western 
benevolence, from a social position in society within that enclosure, as 
represented by the “educated” Africans participating in the trial.
Figure 7. Innocent response to African Western
Without overparsing, it remains noticeable that there are no white 
women in the film, no global feminist solidarity as is evident at the World 
Social Forum. Gender is the alibi for the entire spectrum of good and 
bad globalizing intervention. Has a criticism been represented here on 
the workings of the screen? For, as I have mentioned, Sissako takes good 
care to present a taxonomy of black women, roughly in terms of distance 
from the European Enlightenment, if you like. Islam is elsewhere. The 
“Muslim” woman (presumably the other African women are Muslim 
too) swears in the home of Allah and disappears from the film. And, 
at the film’s end, an Islamic ritual—the funeral of the man who begins 
the film—with no more than minimal subtextual development. And 
yet the implicit possibility of a male solidarity is clearly shown across 
the color-class line across the line where the black African has achieved 
rational epistemic continuity with the white European. When Maître 
Rapaport—incidentally an actual person—interrupts on the side of the 
prosecution, his white colleague says to him, not waiting for procedure: 
“Shut up,” with a gesture behind his rump.
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When he addresses the court, the men active in the village world of 
unofficial microgovernance (please contrast this to world governance), 
disconnect the loudspeaker, also without waiting for procedure.
Figure 8. “Shut up”
Figure 9. Africans disconnect loudspeaker
Sessako and I have slipped in the question of gender, bigger than 
capital, since both sides are caught in reproductive heteronormativity 
and use gender as an instrument, an alibi—“the surrogate proletariat”; 
a question that the organized left intellectual, out of touch, expects only 
women and queers to ask, which is why a feisty philosopher like Agnes 
Heller, deeply sympathetic to women, says she is “against ‘feminism’.”
In conclusion, I quote two paragraphs from my forthcoming book 
to designate the position from where my stereotype of myself rethinks 
comparativism.
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In 1992, asked to give the first T. B. Davie Memorial lecture at the 
University of Cape Town after the lifting of apartheid, I suggested that we 
learn to use the European Enlightenment from below. I used the expres-
sion “ab-use,” because the Latin prefix “ab” says much more than “below.” 
Indicating both “motion away” and “agency, point of origin,” “supporting,” 
as well as “the duties of slaves,” it nicely captures the double bind of the 
postcolonial and the metropolitan migrant regarding the Enlightenment. 
As such, we want the public sphere gains and private sphere constraints 
of the Enlightenment; yet we must also find something relating to “our 
own history” to counteract the fact that the Enlightenment came, to colo-
nizer and colonized alike, through colonialism, to support a destructive 
“free trade.” But “ab-use” can be a misleading neographism and come 
to mean simply “abuse.” That should be so far from our intentions that 
I thought to sacrifice precision and range and simply say “from below.” 
This too rankles, for it assumes that “we,” whoever we are, are below the 
level of the Enlightenment. A double bind. 
The phrase “double bind” comes from Gregory Bateson’s Steps to an 
Ecology of the Mind, first published in 1972.� To begin with, the double bind 
was a way for him to understand childhood schizophrenia qualitatively. 
Bateson was, however, aware that “[b]oth those whose life is enriched by 
trans-contextual gifts and those who are impoverished by trans-contextual 
confusion are alike in one respect: for them there is always or often 
a ‘double take.’” In other words, inhabiting thus the two ends of the 
spectrum, the double bind could be generalized. In “A Theory of Play 
and Fantasy,” Bateson spelled out the training of the imagination in 
terms of a mise en abyme, an indefinite series of mutual reflections. This 
“training,” the bulwark of an aesthetic education, habitually fails with 
religion and nationalism: “Up in the dim region where art, magic, and 
religion meet and overlap, human beings have evolved the ‘metaphor 
that is meant,’ the flag which men will die to save, and the sacrament 
that is felt to be more than ‘an outward and visible sign, given unto us’”;� 
it is interesting that Freud mentions the same two items—“Throne and 
Altar”—in “Fetishism,” as the monitors of fetishistic illogic.�
A comparativism rethought might restore the metaphor to this white 
mythology. In Goethe’s spirit, we can interminably prepare ourselves to 
work in the hope of a promise of equivalence to subaltern spaces and 
times, a hope cradled in despair except when reading flourishes.
Working a century ago, Franz Boas clearly indicated the need for 
deciding if the cultures of “primitive” places had independent origins 
or were influenced by transmission. To compare seemed to be the only 
solution. The time for that initial anthropologistic comparativism is long 
over for us. Undoubtedly we should not rule out the contrast between 
historically independent origin and a comparativist study of dissemina-
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tion from our discipline. In order to be able to do this as part of the 
discipline, however, we have to take a step back and perform the epis-
temological difference, looking forward to an epistemic difference “to 
come”: the lesson of thinking the equivalence of language, potentially, 
in the metapsychological theater.
Columbia University
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